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JOINT SPECIAL OPERATIONS
INTELLIGENCE SUPPORT
A CRITICAL ANALYSIS

BY


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The United States has experienced a rebirth in its special operations capabilities. From the failure of the Iranian hostage rescue mission at a desert airfield called "Desert One", the military and the Congress focused to rebuild US special operations capabilities. The improvements in both special operations utility and capabilities has been impressive. The question that frames this study is; Has intelligence support kept pace with the advances in special operations improvements? This analysis looks at the intelligence support for joint special operations forces in operational or "warfighting" operations. The analysis opens with a discussion of the environment in which special operations forces will operate in the post-Cold War world. The requirements of this environment are captured to establish a baseline for analysis and evaluation of intelligence support. The key role of the special operations intelligence officer is analyzed in the context of the requirements and environment. The selection, training, and utilization of JSOF intelligence officers are discussed. The study's findings address officer training, service intelligence officer assignment policies, compatibility of special operations intelligence architecture with the theater architectures, HUMINT support, and national intelligent agencies support to JSOF. The study concludes that the intelligence support to joint special operations forces has greatly improved--but there are still problems.

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USAWC MILITARY STUDIES PROGRAM PAPER

**JOINT SPECIAL OPERATIONS INTELLIGENCE SUPPORT
A CRITICAL ANALYSIS**

AN INDIVIDUAL STUDY PROJECT

BY

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INTRODUCTION

"...experience also would show that in many of these instances overt military action by the United States is either not appropriate or would not be supported by the American people or the Congress. At that point, the United States has two options. It can develop other instruments by which to protect its interests, or it can turn and walk away." Robert Oates

The United States has experienced a true rebirth in special operations capabilities in the past decade. This rebirth can be traced to the 1980 disaster of the hostage rescue mission at a remote Iranian desert airfield called 'DESERT ONE'. "In the DOD-wide, post-Vietnam draw-down, funding for Special Operations Forces was cut by 95% from its Vietnam high. With this decline came severe force structure cuts, deferred modernization, and reduced readiness. This downward spiral of reduced funding and diminishing capability continued into the late 1970s; and the need for, and utility of, Special Operations Forces was widely questioned."² The failure at 'Desert One' clearly focused the nation's attention on the critical shortfalls in special operations capabilities. The Holloway Commission's investigation of this failure served to chart an initial path for the service's special operations forces (SOF) to rebuild capabilities and credibility.

While the Holloway Commission's report provided the emphasis to start the rebuilding process, the 1986 Cohen-Nunn Act, PL99-661, codified the intent of Congress in upgrading the nation's special operations capabilities. The Cohen-Nunn Act directed the formation of a special operations unified command structure, U.S. Special Operations Command (USSOCOM), and served to highlight the arrival of special operations as a coequal player. No longer would special

operations suffer neglect from the conventionally minded services. The fruits of these efforts were aptly demonstrated in numerous low visibility operations since 1983 and during both Operations Just Cause and Desert Shield/Storm.

Today, the demonstrated special operations capabilities span the entire spectrum of conflict. The march from the ashes of 'Desert One' has been impressive in both the capabilities and utility of the special operations forces in meeting the nation's security needs. Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney, in his 1992 Annual Report to the President and the Congress, addressed the resurgent SOF capabilities this way: "changes in the international security environment confirm that well-trained and equipped special operations forces will continue to be an essential instrument of national policy."³ From the post-Vietnam depression, special operations has now become an essential player in the nation's national security policy.

Special operations are often high risk ventures with the anticipation of high return and place the nation's prestige at stake. The success of these operations depends greatly on the individual skills of the operator, the tactics and techniques of the force, the mode of employment, and the quantity and quality of operational intelligence. As never before, the scope and diversity of US Joint Special Operations Forces (JSOF) operations have placed unique and voluminous demands on the intelligence community. These

requirements span the entire spectrum of intelligence from the precise, detailed information for the tactical operator, through the traditional tactical and operational intelligence, and includes many functions and assets that are normally viewed as strategic. As one author says, "Intelligence is to special operations--any type of special operations--as water is to fish. The one is unthinkable without the other."⁴

SCOPE

The breadth of special operations makes an all encompassing analysis beyond the bounds of this analysis. The diversity of the numerous incidents of peacetime engagement and deployment for training defies any generalization for analysis. Similarly the intelligence requirements in support of Psychological Operations and Civil Affairs are sufficiently different in purpose, magnitude, and diversity to warrant separate analysis in their own right. This analysis is designed to address the operational or war-fighting aspects of joint special operations forces (JSOF) intelligence.

This paper is an analysis of intelligence support to joint special operations. Have the national and military intelligence capabilities kept pace with the very rapid rebuilding of our special operations forces? Has the special operations affinity for and natural intimate relationship with intelligence been institutionally recognized? Is the proper intelligence structure

in place? Are the unique intelligence requirements of JSOF understood? Are special operations intelligence officers receiving the proper training? And, are there critical shortfalls that severely limit intelligence capabilities? These questions frame the analysis that follows.

METHODOLOGY

The traditional method of approaching this type of analysis is a historical perspective, reaching back into history to collect the real or perceived intelligence problems in special operations, grouping these problems for analysis, and presenting possible or recommended solutions. One problem with a historical analysis is the tendency to exhibit an "institutional predilection for using historical analysis to serve institutional needs."⁵ Additionally, in the dynamically changing "New World Order", or to some the "New World Disorder", a historical approach also runs the risk of becoming nothing more than a history lesson, one that fails to provide a relevant glimpse into the future. This study will forgo the historical analysis, adapting instead an interactive contemporary approach. It limits the historical perspective, and draws heavily on the personal experiences of those key intelligence officers who are tasked to lead the special operations intelligence community into the next decade.

CHAPTER 1

THE ENVIRONMENT

"The first, the supreme, the most far-reaching act of judgement that the statesman and commander have to make is to establish by that test the kind of war on which they are embarking; neither mistaking it for, nor trying to turn it into, something that is alien to its nature." Clausewitz

THE OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT

"For forty-five years we have relaxed in the comfortably predictable world of bipolar power politics. For the most part the rules of the game were known and followed... Now this situation has been altered. The world has not entered a halcyon period of impending peace but rather the lid has been lifted on a Pandora's box."⁷ As the nation and its military establishment search for rules in the new world order, the ultimate roles that joint special operations forces will assume are unsure. It is clear that special operations forces' role will be greatly expanded. "In a world of broader, more regionally oriented and ambiguous threats, the United States must remain well prepared for both conventional and unconventional challenges. Each of the four tenets of the new U.S. Defense Strategy calls into play one or more aspects of SOF capabilities."⁸

As the nation struggles to define its vital interests and debates the function of the 'contingency' military in protecting these interests, it appears certain that JSOF will become one of the most flexible and prized 'tools' for the military. This

flexibility may become even more important as the nation debates the criteria for use of its military forces. Since 1984, the Department of Defense has operated under what has been termed the "Weinberger Doctrine" that puts forth strict criteria that should drive the decision to use military force.⁹ Some now counter this 'doctrine' and challenge the "willingness of the American people to pay \$250 billion or even \$200 billion a year for a military that is not very useful."¹⁰ In both political and military usefulness, JSOF will provide effective, flexible, and cost effective forces ideally suited for the nature and environment of the coming decade.

Special operations are often clandestine or low visibility and usually accompanied by some risk to the national prestige and honor. As former Deputy National Security Advisor, Robert Gates, stated: "...experience also would show that in many of these instances overt military action by the United States is either not appropriate or would not be supported by the American people or the Congress. At that point, the United States has two options. It can develop other instruments by which to protect its interests, or it can turn and walk away."¹¹ While Mr. Gates may have been addressing the issue in terms of the elements of national power as well as in the context of the military element of power, it is clear that the nation's joint special operations forces provide the necessary 'instruments' and options. Employed either unilaterally or in conjunction with conventional contingency forces or allies, JSOF provides tremendous capabilities to preclude a situation in

which the nation must walk away from threats to its national interests.

Prior to undertaking a discussion of the intelligence requirements for joint special operations, it is necessary to first define special operations and the operational requirements from which the intelligence requirements flow. While there are numerous definitions of special operations, Joint Test Pub 3-05 defines them this way: "SO describe a category or form of warfare characterized by a unique set of objectives, weapons, and forces. A mission, under a certain set of environmental constraints, may require the application of SO skills and techniques."¹² While this definition links the objectives, weapons, forces and limitations, it fails to provide a clear image of the breadth and scope of the special operations environment - it fails to define why this category of operations is "special".

The publication attempts to further define what is "special" by offering characteristics that cumulatively distinguish special operations from conventional operations. This listing is lengthy and provided in Appendix A to this study. The key characteristics include: high risks for high return; national level interest and participation; covert, clandestine, or low visibility (see Appendix C) in nature; operations conducted at the outer limits of the performance envelopes of both equipment and personnel; and operations frequently requiring the application of discriminate

'surgical force'.

As these characteristics reveal, special operations can be conducted across the spectrum of conflict. The perception of low intensity conflict being the sole realm of special operations, although faulty, is a commonly held view.

"U.S. low intensity conflict military doctrine de-emphasizes traditional reliance on large forces heavily armed with high technology, high firepower weapons intent on achieving total control through violent combat. Instead, LIC doctrine emphasizes decentralized, light forces prepared to apply a flexible variety of means that will influence the outcome of a given situation in coordination with other instruments of nation power. LIC is distinct from special operations which are generally unconventional military activities that may be conducted in a low intensity or any other type of conflict environment."¹³

While LIC is not the sole realm of the JSOF, much of the work done by special operations forces is at the lower end of the spectrum of conflict. While not synonymous, special operations and low intensity conflict are often interwoven by both history and the unique applicability of special operations skills to LIC mission profiles.

THE INTELLIGENCE ENVIRONMENT

"The bipolar world has melted. Peaceful, prosperous coexistence has not yet materialized. Instead, we are confronted with a much more dynamic world where uncertainty and regional instability reign."¹⁴ Just as the operational environment is in turmoil, so is it with intelligence. Rapid change, ambiguous requirements, and

fragmentation of focus mark intelligence in the new world order.

Today's commanders go to battle with better intelligence than ever before; but without 'perfect intelligence', the commander still must deal with uncertainty. Uncertainty, in its various and numerous forms, characterizes combat. "While a soldier in combat may be, in the very real sense, the quintessential risk-taker, his natural--and sensible--instinct will be to reduce or manage risk to the greatest extent possible."¹⁵ As the characteristics of special operations indicate, operations on the margin of the operational envelopes of both equipment and personnel introduce a significant degree of uncertainty. Success in special operations dictates that the uncertainty associated with the enemy, weather, and terrain be minimized through the application of intelligence.

From the intelligence perspective, some may argue that there is little difference between intelligence support for the tactical conventional forces and the requirements of the special operations community. The intelligence cycle of collecting, processing, and disseminating intelligence is, in its basic form, the same. While this may be true at the macro level, the precision, specificity of detail, unique types and sources of information, and the timeliness requirements of JSOF intelligence pose special requirements. Historically, intelligence has been artificially divided into tactical, operational and strategic levels, with specific structures and trained officers to do each. Special operation

usually cross the traditional lines between tactical, operational, and strategic intelligence thus blurring these artificial and ill-defined distinctions. In the intelligence jargon of today, this blurring is termed "seamless support."

With the 'New World Disorder' comes a divergence in focus for the Intelligence Community. The Soviet Union was once the major focus of the Community's resources and attention. While the republics of the former Soviet Union still demand attention, the interests of the United States have shifted. Now, intelligence looks at a much more divergent set of problems. Economic competition, support for human rights, leadership in the new world order, counterterrorism, peacemaking/peacekeeping, environmental interests, and counternarcotic operations demand and receive more attention from the Intelligence Community. In this environment, a central worst-case threat no longer provides a stable long term focus for intelligence. Instead, the nation is faced with numerous threats coming from unexpected places in unexpected forms at unexpected times.

Today's intelligence environment is also one of dwindling resources and keen competition for these limited resources. In the era of declining budgets, a zero-sum game exists where intelligence resources and priority in one area comes only at the expense of some other area or program.

"Economists tell us that the single most expensive

commodity in the business world is information. The reason? The production of information is very labor intensive; it requires a great many highly skilled, and well paid professionals. The situation is much the same in the foreign policy world, where any new intelligence requirement has a high price, usually paid in trade-offs. Collection systems as well as analytical talent are finite. When the nation's attention turns to a new international problem, intelligence refocuses its efforts accordingly."¹⁶

As the special operations capabilities were reemphasized in the 1980s, the requisite intelligence support also required growth and maturity. Resources devoted specifically to special operations requirements were only available at the expense of other competing priorities. Often the special operation intelligence requirements were not totally new, but were rather a refinement of ongoing efforts that had to be modified in scope, timeliness, or specificity. In the environment of the future, special operations intelligence requirements will compete, both directly and obliquely, for the nation's limited intelligence resources.

CHAPTER 2

SPECIAL OPERATIONS INTELLIGENCE REQUIREMENTS

"War is the province of chance. In no sphere of human activity is such a margin to be left for this intruder, because none is so much in constant contact with him on all sides. He increases the uncertainty of every circumstance, and deranges the course of events."¹¹ Clausewitz

This chapter addresses the macro level JSOF intelligence requirements. It will not attempt to address the specific requirements for each operational force. The intent is to offer an appreciation of the generic requirements that distinguish special operations intelligence from conventional tactical intelligence. Several characteristics that differentiate JSOF requirements from those of other military forces are easily identifiable. It is these characteristics or requirements that make the intelligence support to joint special operations forces "special". These six 'requirements' form the outline of this chapter.

CONTINGENCY OPERATIONS

Contingency intelligence is at the heart of many JSOF operations. Such requirements are sufficiently different that they should not be considered as routine. Success in contingency intelligence requires a changed mind-set and operational procedures that recognize the expanded requirements. Contingency operations, by their nature, require the force to deal with the unexpected or unanticipated threat. Dealing with the contingency threat is in itself a difficult task, but the nature of contingency response requires the intelligence staff to deal with additional

difficulties such as unique task organizations, critical time sensitivity, and nonstandard communications systems. The requirements that follow have the greatest impact on the success or failure of contingency intelligence.

Prioritized Intelligence effort: The first and most important task of contingency intelligence organizations is to focus and prioritize the effort. Not only does the stiff competition for resources demand prioritization, the limited personnel available at most organizations limit what is physically possible. In this environment, no intelligence organization can be strong everywhere--to attempt to do so guarantees failure. Prioritization will take place either through planning or by default. A planned process requires a "contract" between the intelligence officer and the commander. Certain areas will be covered in great detail, while risk is accepted in others by design, not by luck.

Robust In-house Intelligence Holdings: Contingency operations place a special demand on the organization's organic, in-house intelligence holdings. Short reaction times dictate that initial planning intelligence be very quickly assembled. The only way to achieve responsiveness is to have the organic capability to satisfy immediately most of the initial requirements. Even though the intelligence staff has a priority to work against, prudence demands a limited effort be devoted to assuring a minimal level of support is available for unforeseen requirements. This effort might

include basic encyclopedic intelligence, limited order of battle data, and mapping products.

Capability to Rapidly Change the Intelligence Focus: Contingency operations are accompanied by a compressed, dynamic decision cycle. The decision cycle drives the requirements that rapidly change and refocus the intelligence priorities. The commander's initial intelligence requirements invariably revolve around decisions on sizing and shaping the force. Once the decisions associated with sizing the force are made, the commander rapidly shifts to another set of decisions involving the operation. The intelligence focus shifts to the specifics of the enroute threats, physical information on the drop or landing zone, the specifics of the target, enemy forces in the immediate area of the entry point, and reenforcing forces. The commander's final set of decisions concern decisive operations, and redeployment. Each set of decision requirements demand an associated intelligence priority effort. All these decisions and their attendant intelligence requirements are not what makes contingency intelligence a special challenge. The fact that all these decisions must be made in a very short deployment sequence is what makes contingency intelligence different.

Readily Accessible Databases and Collection Systems: Rapid and unencumbered access to theater and national level intelligence agencies and their databases is critical. Contingency intelligence

requires real time access to current crisis intelligence and to quickly update the organization's in-house intelligence holdings. While some will argue that access to national level agencies must be direct without the layering of intermediate headquarters, the real key in contingency operations is the timeliness of the data and not the channels through which it is obtained. Regardless of the channels, the contingency force must be able to acquire data rapidly and to pass efficiently its collection and production requirements.

Established and Practiced "Push" Intelligence Flow: Short response times demand that higher level intelligence organizations clearly understand the requirements of subordinate elements and provide the right information to satisfy those requirements. Higher level intelligence organizations must "push" what is already understood as the requirements rather than waiting for the subordinate elements to ask or "pull" information. Intelligence "pulls" are time consuming to prepare, transmit, and track. They serve, in a fast moving environment, to clog the already burdened communications systems. Therefore, intelligence "pulls" should be limited to those unforeseen items that are unique to a specific operation.

Well Developed Contingency Intelligence Architecture: Contingency intelligence demands an architecture that is flexible, adaptive and supported by a robust, long-haul communications

capability. Acquiring, producing, and moving data to the right decision maker at the right time usually proves more difficult in practice than in theory. The intelligence architecture to support a forward deployed command and control node, while simultaneously supporting deploying forces, is complex. The heart of the contingency intelligence operation, at least initially, is the garrison operation. The garrison has detailed databases, connectivity with national collection and production efforts, robust communications, and the bulk of the analytical talent.

As the deployment sequence progresses, a point is reached where the center of gravity for the intelligence operation shifts to the deployed elements. The architecture and planning required to bring down the garrison location and stand up the deployed intelligence operation is complex in its own right. It is further complicated by operational requirements that will not allow a degradation in the level of support during this difficult transition. Decisions on the movement of equipment, key analysts, and communications must be carefully planned, phased, and integrated with the available deployment flow. If not documented in the appropriate standard operating procedures and often practiced, this process will break down with devastating results.

Experienced Collection Managers: The contingency force's collection managers must be versed in the capabilities and limitations of all national, theater, and service collection

systems. They must be armed with a fast, responsive method to levy collection requirements on those systems. Since contingency forces could find themselves operating in any geographical CINC's area of responsibility, collection managers must not only master the organic and national collection systems; but they must also clearly understand the capabilities and limitations of unique theater collection and production assets.

Flexible and Innovative Intelligence Officers: Success in contingency intelligence operations depends on the innovation and flexibility of assigned intelligence personnel. It is the assigned intelligence officers who penetrate the various bureaucracies and levels of command to find the person or system that can produce the required information. It is this same officer who must bring it all together in both process and product. The development of these traits requires experience and training.

Requirements to process what is normally collected in different and unusual ways. This is best addressed through an example. Take the requirement to infiltrate forces by air into an area that is protected by a comprehensive air defense network. The intelligence system does an excellent job in collecting, processing, and storing information on most threat radar systems. The data identifies each time a specific radar has been detected by any one of the numerous collectors that form the complementary collection capabilities of the nation. What the data does not identify is the "negative

collection", e.g., when the collectors looked for the radars but the radars were not operating. Determining when a radar is down for scheduled maintenance (most have periodic maintenance requirements) is something our national SIGINT system cannot routinely answer. This data is not normally stored in the data bases and requires very time-consuming reconstruction to estimate. Yet it is this type of data that is critical to contingency operations.

SURPRISE, DECEPTION, AND SECURITY

The intelligence requirements generated by operations of a low visibility, covert, or clandestine character are especially voluminous and diverse. Surprise and security are critical to special operations success. Requirements range from the straight forward, such as enabling an aircraft to fly into hostile territory undetected by enemy sensors, to the far more complex intelligence required to allow a special operations operative to infiltrate through a civilian airport, survive, and operate in a denied territory.

Traditional operational security (OPSEC) is only intensified in JSOF operations. Security and surprise are mission imperatives. To lose security or surprise is often an abort criteria for JSOF missions. Often, tactical deception may be used to augment the security of the operations. Where deception is used, intelligence must determine which enemy sensors are available to collect the

deception story, how much data must be fed into the system to assure the enemy's intelligence arrives at the desired conclusion, and how the decision maker will react to the deception.

The covert and clandestine nature of many JSOF activities also demand exhaustive post-mission security measures to protect the missions and the participants. When conducting such operations, JSOF elements often must interface with high level elements of both DOD and other agencies who may have participated in or who have knowledge of the operations to adequately protect the mission and its clandestine or covert nature.

ABILITY TO ACCESS THEATER INTELLIGENCE ARCHITECTURES

JSOF intelligence elements must have access to theater data bases and theater collections systems. Much data is collected and maintained in the theater intelligence activity, either independently or as a delegated producer for the national intelligence agencies. Some of this data never reaches national databases. Similarly, theater intelligence collection systems possess capabilities that often cannot be duplicated by national or tactical systems. It is imperative that JSOF intelligence organizations have rapid and comprehensive access to the data bases and collections system. This access must not be limited to the operational events in the particular theater; it must accommodate day to day training as well.

PREFERENCE FOR HUMAN INTELLIGENCE

Special operations forces have a longstanding bias in favor of human intelligence (HUMINT). This bias is often visible in the desire of the operational force to "talk to someone who has been there." In this context, HUMINT includes not only the covert or espionage element, but also the less glamorous overt elements such as interviews and debriefings of 'legal travelers'. The bias often reflects the inability of the national technical collection systems to provide the granularity or specificity of the data the operators perceive to be critical to operational success. On the other hand, HUMINT sources require more time to develop.

JSOF operators also search for the deeper perceptions of conditions in the target area over time. While the national technical means can provide a series of snapshot looks at a target, HUMINT possesses the capability to "loiter" in the area, providing a more continuous picture. The "golden nuggets" that will assure operational success (building blueprints, photographs of the inside of a building, specific locations and routines for guards or sentries, and other such information that is not readily collected by technical collection means. This is not to say that special operations forces are not consumers of the SIGINT and IMINT systems. The opposite is true. The special operations community is a voracious consumer of all intelligence capabilities and relies heavily on IMINT and SIGINT derived intelligence.

LONG-HAUL INTELLIGENCE COMMUNICATIONS SYSTEM

One of the characteristics of special operations is the long distances that often separate the JSOF operational elements from a major command and control node. While a small command element from the controlling headquarters may accompany the operational forces, this element is usually very small and limited in capability. For the intelligence staff this situation translates into a requirement for long-haul, secure, high volume communications capability to allow the movement of large amounts of tailored intelligence from the garrison's robust intelligence holdings and analysts to the deployed command element. The central requirement is for large capacity, high quality, secure communications necessary to move imagery rapidly from the point of exploitation to the operational forces in the field.

CHAPTER 3

SPECIAL OPERATIONS INTELLIGENCE OFFICER

"As the human eye in a dark room dilates its pupil, draws in the little light that there is, partially distinguishes objects by degrees, and at last knows them quite well, so it is in war with the experienced soldier, while the novice is only met by pitch dark night."¹⁸ Clausewitz

This chapter addresses the JSOF intelligence officer. It attempts to define the characteristics of a good JSOF intelligence officer and looks at how this officer is recruited, trained and managed by the services.

JSOF INTELLIGENCE OFFICER

"Special operations forces train for missions in contingency operations and war that, in accordance with Service and joint doctrine, only they conduct."¹⁹ Additional non-traditional requirements such as peacetime competition, counterterrorism, counternarcotics, and peacemaking/peacekeeping are also JSOF requirements. JSOF intelligence officers must be versed in all of these as well as in the traditional military intelligence skills. In addition to being technically proficient, JSOF intelligence officers must also be attuned to the nuances of interagency, political-military, and coalition coordination in the intelligence process.

RECRUITING

JSOF intelligence personnel are recruited from service qualified and recommend intelligence officers. While special skills and abilities are sought, JSOF often looks for the best possible individual to fill a vacancy, accepting less than optimal experience or special skills to obtain the desired officer. Recruiting from the services is not easy, and the desired skills and abilities are often not readily visible on the officer's formal records brief. In this environment, it is common for the JSOF intelligence officer, especially at the more senior grades, to be selected based on recommendations from others in the JSOF intelligence field. This word-of-mouth recruiting has proven relatively successful in the past but runs against the personnel policies of the services. Service personnel managers will ask for a requisition that specifies special skill and knowledge requirements. On the other hand, the JSOF recruiter will not necessarily know what he is looking for until he sees it. Both sides in this struggle are right.

JSOF INTELLIGENCE OFFICER TRAINING

Most JSOF intelligence officers begin their JSOF assignments with solid service intelligence skills. They learn their JSOF unique skills primarily from on-the-job training in the "school of hard knocks". If joint special operations intelligence support is truly special, and the contribution of special operations to the nation's military strategy is significant, why is there no

recognition of this with special intelligence training and repetitive assignments for intelligence officers in the special operations community?

Is a special course required, or is the school of hard knocks sufficient? Several schools have been developed to transition well qualified conventional military personnel into special operators. These schools include: the JFK school at Fort Bragg, North Carolina, that trains Army's Special Forces, PSYOPS, and Civil Affairs personnel; the Navy Special Warfare Center at Coronado, California trains the Navy's special operators; and Air Force special operators are trained at the Central Training Flight at Hurlburt Field, Florida.

Thus the operational side of JSOF has recognized that being "special" is more than just a name and requires intensive schooling for those who wear that title. The question now becomes, is there a valid requirement for special operations intelligence officers be schooled to turn a "vanilla" service intelligence officer into a joint special operations qualified intelligence officer?

Historically, the intelligence officers chosen for duty in JSOF duties have come without specific and detailed training in special operations. These officers are normally hand picked and bring broad service-based conventional skills to the job. Few, however, have special operational experience of any magnitude or

currency. What is different that the conventional intelligence training systems have failed to prepare these officers to face? The differences include new relationships with the national intelligence agencies, the Department of State (DOS), Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA), the various Embassy country teams, special category intelligence systems, the 'black-SOF' special mission units,²⁰ 'Special Activities'²¹ and new organizational structures. All these contribute to an almost vertical learning curve for newly assigned JSOF intelligence officers. This learning curve, coupled with a new emphasis on the timeliness of intelligence and the level of specificity required for 'surgical' special operations, all combine to humble even the brightest and most capable conventional intelligence officer.

OFFICER ASSIGNMENT POLICIES

Should the services track special operations intelligence officers by a special skill identifier to ensure their particular experiences and talents are maximized? Should these officers, once qualified in special operations, serve repetitive tours in special operations? A disturbing trend, especially within the Army, is the reluctance to serve multiple tours in special operations intelligence jobs. There is a strong perception that assignment, especially repetitive assignments, of an intelligence officer to service or joint special operations duties is detrimental to the officer's career. While some officers are willing to put their

future career at risk and serve in repetitive assignments, many opt to follow the conventional "wisdom" and avoid initial or subsequent assignments in special operations.

The intelligence structure within the JSOF community desperately needs strong, well rounded, and experienced intelligence officers well versed in service peculiar special operations and JSOF requirements. Joint special operations intelligence support billets exist not only at the USSOCOM headquarters but also at the national intelligence agencies, the theater intelligence staffs, theater SOCs, and in the service intelligence structures. These are not jobs that should be filled by intelligence officers with little or no experience in joint special operations.

If the military departments are serious about assigning the best qualified special operations intelligence officers to these jobs, there must be a system for tracking these officers within the services' personnel systems. The awarding of a special skill identifier for all special operations intelligence qualified officers is required. While service personnel managers will not likely receive such a requirement with open arms, it appears the only way to assure that the right people fill the critical joint special operations intelligence billets.

CHAPTER 5

SPECIAL OPERATIONS INTELLIGENCE STRUCTURE

Intelligence structure in support of JSOF includes the organic intelligence assets assigned to USSOCOM and its assigned forces, the theater SOC and its inherent support from the theater intelligence structure, the national intelligence agencies and intelligence support from other government agencies. This chapter will address the intelligence structure supporting JSOF with a brief description of each element and discussion of special problems in supporting JSOF forces.

USSOCOM INTELLIGENCE STRUCTURE

The intelligence directorate at headquarters USSOCOM is authorized 126 spaces to perform its mission. Enhanced by contractor support of approximately 50 personnel, the USSOCOM intelligence structure is the smallest of all the unified commands. Another 65 spaces are programmed for the formation of the USSOCOM Joint Intelligence Center (JICSOC).²² While the structure is small by comparison, the USSOCOM J-2 believes this structure, once JICSOC is fully operational, is sufficient to provide the necessary intelligence support.²³

An anomaly in the USSOCOM intelligence structure is the grade of the J-2. The unified commands are normally staffed with a

general/flag officer--except USSOCOM and USTRANSCOM. The initial USSOCOM manning documents included a general officer as the J-2. Early in the process of forming the command, this general officer position was diverted to form the J-8. The intent was to get another general officer authorization at a later date for the J-2. As with many actions of this nature in the manpower arena, the backfill for the J-2 position never materialized. Is this a problem? The answer will depend on where you sit. There is little doubt that the colonels who have filled this position have been successful in building and maintaining a comprehensive and capable intelligence support capability. The question then becomes one of the impact of the lower grade on the incumbent's ability to interface with the national community and other J-2s? The current J-2 is comfortable in this arrangement. For the long term, the mismatch should be remedied.

The Theater Special Operations Commands

The theaters' Special Operations Commands (SOC) do not possess the resources to collect, process, or disseminate intelligence. The theater SOCs, even though they are designated as subunified commands, are manned at cadre level (17 at SOCLANT to 44 at SOCEUR) during peacetime and are intended to grow rapidly in conflict, as demonstrated by the Special Operation Command for Central Command (SOCCENT) during Desert Shield/Storm. During peacetime the SOCs draw heavily on the theater intelligence system that is designed and maintained primarily to support the conventional force's

intelligence requirements. Theater SOCs are the weakest link in the JSOF intelligence structure.

The cadre manning is not sufficient to accomplish more than policy formulation and special operations coordination on the theater staff. Without major augmentation of personnel, intelligence automation, and communications connectivity, the SOC J-2's capabilities are insufficient to provide the necessary intelligence support for the deployment or employment of significant special operations forces. The problems with the SOC structure has been recognized by Congress. In the 1992 DOD Authorization Act, the Senate version required SOCSENT and SOCSOUTH be general or flag level officers. The House version did not contain such language. In conference, the language urged the Secretary of Defense to assign general officers to these positions.²⁴

National Intelligence Agencies

National agency support to USSOCOM J-2 includes a liaison element from each agency assigned duties at the Command's headquarters. DIA provides a senior liaison officer, while NSA provides a senior liaison officer and acryptologic support element consisting of 5-6 personnel. Similar in function and mission to the other national agencies, the CIA also provides a liaison element. These liaison elements were established shortly after the formation of USSOCOM and continue to function effectively. The

liaison elements provide valuable assistance in communications between the agencies and USSOCOM. The real measure of the national intelligence agencies' support to JSOF is the number of people dedicated to JSOF support within the agency proper, not in the dedication and efficiency of its liaison effort.

The Defense Intelligence Agency: DIA is chartered as the primary agency to support military operations, including JSOF operations. Within the DIA, support to special operations is recognized in both functionally assigned missions and dedicated resources. The Office of Global Analysis is the major contributor for analytical and operational production support to special operations forces, while a separate branch provides imagery support to JSOF.

The Office for Global Analysis addresses such issues as low-intensity conflict, terrorism, counternarcotics, crisis support, targeting, and special geographical products. This office has undergone several reorganizations over the last year, and many believe another reorganization is imminent. DIA is studying a major restructuring in light of the new post-Cold War realities and resource constraints. The current leadership is placing a major emphasis on functional rather than geographical or other structures. If implemented, it appears that a functional approach may gather JSOF functions in a more streamlined organizational structure. The success in this restructuring, from the JSOF

perspective, is the quality and quantity of the effort devoted to JSOF identified functions.

The National Security Agency: Unlike the other national intelligence agencies, the historical relationship between NSA and JSOF elements has not been marked with spirited antagonism. NSA has built and maintained a commitment to support special operations within the leadership and operational elements of the agency. This support includes special collection operations, data bases, assistance with hardware development, tailored SIGINT products and on-line data distribution systems. NSA also maintains a comprehensive crisis support system to support JSOF elements. Dedicated communication systems, on-call technical support, and a responsive analytical capability are readily available for JSOF use.

The Central Intelligence Agency: JSOF support from the CIA has been a source of friction for many years. There seems to be a perception of military special operations infringing on the covert "special activities" and clandestine operations that are part of the agency's responsibility. Also causing friction is the perceived infringement by special operations personnel on what CIA believes to be their HUMINT turf. Criticism of the CIA's support to conventional operations such as Just Cause and Desert Shield/Storm have also been leveled. While there may have been many barriers and frictions, there is strong evidence that the CIA

and JSOF forces work well together and have produced many successes, when the organizational interests have been compatible.

In response to the criticism of lack of CIA support for military operations, former Director Gates moved to organizationally improve support for the military. In Congressional testimony he described this reorganization:

"I have established the position of Associate Deputy Director for Operations for Military Affairs and an associated Office of Military Affairs in CIA....this position has already been filled by Major General Roland Lajoie, United States Army. General Lajoie will be responsible, for improving CIA's planning; strengthening the role of DCI representatives at the major commands and at the Pentagon; developing procedures so that CIA is regularly informed of military needs for intelligence support; developing plans for CIA support in national, theater, and deployed joint intelligence centers during crises; and the availability of CIA officers for participation with the military on selected exercises."²⁵

The new CIA support structure is now in place. The impact this structure may have is a function of how well the organization is received within the CIA and the bureaucratic momentum it is able to build to ameliorate some of the traditional impediments to support to military operations in general and JSOF in particular. JSOF requirements cause the CIA particular problems in that they cross the internal agency boundaries between operations (Deputy Director for Operations) and intelligence (Deputy Director for Intelligence). In the near term, judgement should be reserved. A fair evaluation will not be practical for at least a couple years.

SUPPORT FROM OTHER AGENCIES

The JSOF intelligence requirements often overlap with agencies outside those normally considered a part of the national defense community. Special relationships have developed over time based on a commonality of interest and missions. These relationships include the Department of State, Drug Enforcement Administration, FBI, and certain allied special operations forces. The details of these relationships are not pertinent to this analysis. The point of emphasis is that the relationships exists and provide valuable intelligence data.

CHAPTER 6

FINDINGS

"...we shall teach each other. First because we have a vast amount of experience behind us, and secondly, in my opinion, it is only through free criticism of each other's ideas that truth can be thrashed out..." J.P.C. Fuller

While substantial progress has been made in providing intelligence to JSOF, there is still a strong perception among operations and intelligence personnel that more is to be done. Col William G. Boykin puts it this way:

"Intelligence support to SF [special forces] remains a problem area. It is one of the most sensitive and emotional issues within SF at the moment. After-action reports from Operation Just Cause indicate that a lack of intelligence was a significant problem. While improvements have been made in some areas, there remains an endemic problem with coordination among the various agencies responsible for intelligence and the SOF operational units. Cooperation among agencies is often minimal and little evidence exists to indicate that it will improve. The Cohen-Nunn act included language relative to both SF intelligence requirements and interagency coordination in order to draw attention to the need for both. The general feeling at the operation level of SF is that this objective has not been achieved and Congressional intent has not materialized."²⁶

This chapter addresses the progress made in meeting the intelligence requirements of JSOF elements. The findings are grouped according to sequence the topic was addressed in the preceding chapters. The findings are not the solutions. They are instead a snap shot of where we are today.

CONTINGENCY OPERATIONS/JOINT SPECIAL OPERATIONS INTELLIGENCE

Elements within the JSOF have moved to develop the necessary capability to successfully operate in a contingency environment. These developments include in-house production (USSOCOM Joint Intelligence Center is authorized and in the process of activation), unique capabilities to interface with national and theater collectors, robust organic capability to tailor national and theater level intelligence for JSOF use, and capable communications connectivity. These capabilities, coupled with high quality collection managers and intelligence officers, have produced notable success.

Probably the most visible JSOF contingency intelligence success is the USSOCOM's Special Operations Command Research, Analysis, and Threat Evaluation System (SOCRATES). SOCRATES was developed to "encompasses the total intelligence support needs for SOF mission activities, to include computers, communications and map and imagery handling equipment."²⁷ This capability now exists at the Command's headquarters, the theater SOCs, and most of USSOCOM's subordinate elements. It provides the capability to operate effectively and efficiently in the fast-paced world of contingency operations.

OFFICER TRAINING

A definitive need exists for special training of service intelligence officers in JSOF intelligence operations. The on-the-

job-training in the "school of hard knocks" is insufficient to meet the needs of the nation in this critical area. The task is not so much to teach high quality 'vanilla' intelligence officers about intelligence, it is more a task of teaching them about special operations, the players, and the unique relationships.

The DIA has recognized this shortfall and established, with the assistance of USSOCOM, a special operations intelligence course at the Defense Intelligence College. The pilot offering of this course took place in the fall of 1992, but the assessment of its effectiveness has yet to be made. It is, however, a very strong step in the right direction, providing JSOF-unique instruction to both JSOF assigned and JSOF supporting personnel. A copy of the course outline is included as Appendix B.

SERVICE ASSIGNMENT POLICIES

Current service assignment policies appear to discourage tracking and utilization of special operations experienced intelligence officers. While the Army has begun to assign the additional skill indicator of "S" for enlisted intelligence specialist to indicate special operations qualification, there seems to be little interest within the services for a similar action for officers.

Assignment officers and detailers often appear to believe that assignments in special operations, especially for more than a

single tour, are a career 'kiss of death'. Fact or not, such perceptions coming from the assignment officer or career manager certainly discourages many quality officers from joining the JSOF intelligence ranks. This problem appears most acute in the Army, where higher and higher percentages of qualified officers chose to follow the path of risk avoidance, making JSOF requirements difficult to fulfill.²

There is also a strong perception that promotion boards considering senior special operations intelligence officers do not view the special operations jobs in the same light as conventional intelligence jobs in the same grade. One is forced to conclude that special operations experience is almost immaterial to the conventional Army. The promotion rates for senior JSOF qualified intelligence officers support this perception, at least on the surface. While difficult to prove, it seems more than coincidence that no SOC J-2 was selected for promotion to Colonel, and no SOF intelligence officers have been promoted to General/Flag officer rank.

Fixing the problem at the joint level is only a partial solution. Both service and joint billets must be viewed as a good career opportunity to attract quality intelligence officers. Without repetitive assignments in service and joint special operations intelligence, the system will continue to force solid service intelligence officers to climb a steep learning curve on

every assignment. This steep learning curve also has an organizational impact. Organizations that have good intelligence officers are reluctant to allow these officers to leave, even for career enhancing opportunities, knowing that experienced, quality replacements are difficult to locate. A kind of 'Catch 22' appears to have developed.

COMPATIBILITY WITH THEATER INTELLIGENCE SYSTEMS

The ability to easily plug JSOF intelligence systems into theater architectures continues to be an area of concern. USSOCOM's SOCRATES is a very sophisticated intelligence data storage, analysis, and transmission capability. A major step has taken place with SOCRATES over the past year, with the theater SOCs capability to access the system. While this provides a tremendous capability to the SOC, the interoperability stops at this point. The SOC is faced with a situation whereby it has a faster and more responsive capabilities for JSOF peculiar intelligence than the theater intelligence structure that supports the CINC. Yet, the SOC lacks the necessary personnel to exploit this new and powerful capability and is unable to automatically pass this data into the theater intelligence architecture (the theater architectures vary significantly from theater to theater). This problem is somewhat ameliorated by the USSOCOM J-2 operational practice of providing intelligence people and equipment to augment the theater SOC when chop of operational forces occurs.

While using USSOCOM augmentees in the SOC is of great value and assists in solving the SOC's personnel shortage, the solution is to develop true interoperability in intelligence automation and communications systems. In an attempt to address the long term requirements and solutions, USSOCOM J-2 instigated a SOF Command Intelligence Architecture Plan, or CIAP, with each Unified Command. This ongoing program is supported by General Defense Intelligence Program (GDIP) funding and contractor manpower.

HUMAN INTELLIGENCE SUPPORT

HUMINT often is the only source that will satisfy critical JSOF intelligence requirements. Yet, HUMINT is the major problem in intelligence support to joint special operations.²⁹ HUMINT in this context includes not only the covert espionage and secret agents, but also overt human collection such as attaches or diplomats, and debriefing of legal travelers, refugees, emigres, defectors, contractors, architects, businessmen, academics, etc. In the 1980s, the abuses of the previous two decades haunted the HUMINT community. The deeds and abuses of the past, along with the investigations such as the Church and Pike Committees, produced an air of misgiving and mistrust. The U.S. Army also divested most of its organic HUMINT capabilities during this period, giving the missions to the CIA. HUMINT was not as glamorous or productive as the national technical means, and it carried a stigma of mistrust and potential abuse.

The nation's HUMINT shortfalls have been long known and much discussed. While covert or clandestine HUMINT is the source of many concerns and oversight, the resources and efforts devoted to open or overt HUMINT collection are also limited. The "golden nuggets" of the special operations intelligence world are often available to overt HUMINT collection (e.g., the blueprints of a building or facility or recent first-hand knowledge of a particular building or facility that cannot be obtained from imagery). It is easy to see that these 'nuggets' are not readily collected by the technical means. Yet, as Senator David Boren has observed: "With respect to overt collection using human sources, no one in the intelligence community effectively manages or rationalizes such collection for the community as a whole."³⁰

HUMINT is vitally important but not the panacea for JSOF intelligence requirements. HUMINT is the most difficult of all the intelligence disciplines to direct against a specific target or organization during crisis operations. Unlike the national technical means, HUMINT cannot be turned on and focused with the flip of a switch or the prioritization of a computer program. HUMINT requires long lead times to train, develop the necessary cover, and gain access the target area. Even if the time is available, HUMINT is often limited by the viability and fragility of sources, access to the desired target, and the ability to provide data in a timely and responsive manner. The ability of the HUMINT operator, either directly or through other agents or

sources, to gain access to the specific target is the most limiting factor in HUMINT. HUMINT is not the easiest collection means to employ, but it may be the key to success for JSOF operations.

Recently, the intelligence community formally recognized that shortfalls in HUMINT still exist. Robert Gates, then Director of Central Intelligence, addressed this shortfall in his 1 April 1992 statement before the Joint Committee Hearings of the US Congress.

"...we have reached agreement to create a National Human Intelligence Tasking Center that will be managed by the Deputy Director of Operations at CIA. For the first time in the history of US intelligence, we will have an integrated interagency mechanism for tasking human intelligence requirements to that part of the community that has the best chance of acquiring the information at least cost and least risk. The Center will have representatives from the Department of Defense and the Bureau of Intelligence and Research of the Department of State."³¹

As the Director recognized in his statement, HUMINT performance in the past has not been up to the task for the nation or its special operations forces. The question at this point is, will this reorganization actually produce the necessary results and gather the 'golden nuggets' for JSOF?

NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCIES SUPPORT

The lack of national level focus on JSOF requirements was easily understood in the Cold War era. The national agencies focused on and optimized systems and data bases for high- to mid- intensity conflict primarily against the Soviet Union. Additionally, few in

the national intelligence arena were versed in and truly understood joint special operations intelligence requirements. Simply stated, JSOF and its operational environment were not the banner carriers for the nation's military and therefore, they were also not the emphasis of the national intelligence agencies.

During much of the 1980s, JSOF elements were rarely satisfied with the intelligence support they received. While the national intelligence community may not have responded as effectively as desired, some of the "blame" rightfully rests with the JSOF intelligence elements. Unrealistic requirements and priorities, excessive compartmentation, expectations far beyond reasonable capabilities, and the failure to use the standard channels to inject collection and production requirements into the national system all compounded already difficult problems. The 1990s have seen vast improvements in these areas. While expectations and demands remain high, the requirements are better defined, the priorities more realistic and the products more useable. Much progress has been made.

Measuring support to JSOF at any national agency is difficult and imprecise. National intelligence agencies organize personnel and data bases along geographical and functional lines that do not necessarily fit nicely with JSOF missions and environments. Geographic or functional, analysts at the national agencies do not wear name tags or duty titles that specify support to JSOF. The

operations of JSOF elements may range the full spectrum of conflict on a global basis, and most of the intelligence collected and processed for conventional forces is applicable to JSOF operations. Additionally, functional intelligence on terrorism, narcotics, or insurgency may find the JSOF as one of the major consumers. National level intelligence support for JSOF is being provided; the problem is in measuring that support against a standard for adequacy.

In addition to the organizational structure of an agency, the resources devoted to intelligence data bases either directly designed or modified to support special operations is another measure of levels of support being provided. These data bases, as the organization themselves, may be organized either functionally or geographically. Utility in these data bases is based on the data elements and the ability of the special operations user to quickly and efficiently tailor this data for consumption by the operational commander.

Databases with applicability to JSOF requirements have flourished in the last decade. Each national intelligence agency has a program to develop or tailor data base systems to support some JSOF requirements. Evidence indicates that large quantities of national intelligence agencies' resources have been devoted to JSOF applicable data bases. This program is not stagnant, and the work continues at each agency.

DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

The DIA has a large and comprehensive effort to support the JSOF requirements. As with most agencies in the post-Cold War period, DIA is shrinking in both manpower and budget. Facing this reality, a major reorganization is about to take place. While the specifics of the reorganization are not yet clear, it appears that a major portion of the agency will be structured along functional lines with a deputy director responsible and accountable for each function. The goals appear to be efficiency, accountability and improved support. However, many users fear that the upcoming personnel reductions may have a very adverse effect on the quality of support to JSOF and that the elements within DIA that provide support to JSOF forces may take a disproportionate share of the personnel reductions. The jury must remain out on this topic for this analysis. The specifics of the restructuring are not yet public, and the inherent personnel turbulence in both reductions and reassessments cannot yet be addressed.

THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

The problems of the past are recognized by the key players at the CIA and within the JSOF intelligence structure. The impact of the new CIA structure will take time to assess. JSOF requires CIA support, and CIA support for the military is demanded by the Congress. The key to future success is assuring the institutional interest of both the CIA and USSOCOM operations are compatible. There is significant optimism among JSOF elements that significant

change is occurring. The historic frictions have lessened, and a cautious cooperative atmosphere has developed. The test of time will determine whether this optimism is warranted.

NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY

As with the other national agencies, NSA is shrinking. It has also undergone two major reorganizations within the last three years. The last reorganization has arranged most of the agency's elements supporting JSOF within a single structure under the Deputy Director for Operations. This element's director is also dual hatted as the Assistant Deputy Director for Military Support. This functionally grouping of the elements that traditionally support special operations in a single organization facilitates JSOF coordination and operations.

While the elements that support JSOF appear at this point to be secure, there is concern. There is a fear that the Agency may dissolve the functional support to the military and special operations by additional reorganizations. While the question of JSOF support is not one of organization, a move away from a functional structure that scatters elements that support JSOF throughout the agency is not conducive to smooth and efficient support. The current structure and support is judged to be adequate.

INTELLIGENCE SUPPORT TO PEACETIME ENGAGEMENT

This analysis has been deliberately limited to the operational and war-fighting aspects of JSOF. Research for this paper surfaced a significant intelligence shortfall that lies outside the established boundary but is deserving of comment. This shortfall is the failure of intelligence at all levels from national to tactical to provide adequate support to JSOF elements conducting peacetime engagement operations. These operations include small mobile training teams, medical support teams, deployments for training, and other similar operations. This shortfall requires immediate attention by both the intelligence and operational communities. A special need exists to provide predeployment intelligence to these operations and to debrief the operators on redeployment to gain the feedback data that can only be collected from someone who has lived and worked in the particular areas. Better predeployment intelligence support and a strong formal feedback mechanism must be quickly developed to fix this problem. While efforts have been made over the years by DIA, USASOC, and USSOCOM, no adequate program has been forthcoming.

CHAPTER 7

CONCLUSIONS

"It is no use saying, 'we are doing our best.' You have to succeed in doing what is necessary." Sir Winston Churchill

Intelligence support to joint special operations forces is unique and requires unique and innovative solutions. As the capabilities of the nation's joint special operations forces have risen from the ashes of Desert One, intelligence support to these forces has also grown. With the exception of the nation's HUMINT capabilities, the problems of intelligence support for joint special operations forces are known, understood, and are improving. In most cases, a plan of attack has been developed and resources applied to solve the problems. The situation will get better over time, unless the reductions endanger the structure that is in place.

In the introduction of this analysis, six questions were used to frame the analysis. It may be useful to look at these questions in light of the intervening discussions.

1. *Have the national and military intelligence capabilities kept pace with the very rapid rebuilding of special operations forces?* My answer to this is yes. This is not to say that there are not still problems and challenges, just not single "war stopper" at

this point.

2. *Has the special operations affinity and natural intimacy for intelligence been institutionally recognized?* Again a firm yes. The intelligence structure in some of our JSOF is the largest staff element in the commands. The national intelligence agencies have also moved to satisfy the JSOF intelligence requirements in personnel, data bases and products. Much has been accomplished in the last decade.

3. *Is the proper intelligence structure in place?* With the completion of the ongoing JICSOC effort, the most glaring shortfall in structure is the organic intelligence staff of the theater SOCs. While numerous minor intelligence structure issues exist, the overall structure is assessed as adequate, though a note of caution is necessary. The downsizing and reorganizations of the national intelligence agencies is of concern to the special operations intelligence community. There is a fear, unfounded as of yet, that the special operations support structure will be the target of a more than equitable reduction when the requirements are in fact growing dramatically.

4. *Are the unique intelligence requirements of JSOF understood?* JSOF intelligence requirements enjoy special treatment by the national intelligence community. This is not to say that the agencies always agree with the requirements or the crisis mode in

which they are often received, but the understanding is present. The days are gone of demanding justification for every requirement, and the national agencies have developed a "PUSH" mentality. They understand the requirements and are proactive in satisfying these requirements without waiting for the JSOF the ask.

5. *Are special operations intelligence officers receiving the proper training?* From an institutional perspective, the answer to this question is no. Historically, JSOF organizations have recruited high performing service-qualified intelligence officers and used on-the-job-training to satisfy the special operations unique training requirements. The DIA sponsored course is a solid step in the right direction. Not only will it assist the operational elements in training special operations intelligence officers, it will also provide a forum to train many in the national agencies who otherwise would have very little knowledge of special operations intelligence.

6. *Are there critical shortfalls that severely limit intelligence capabilities?* The single critical shortfall is actually not a special operations unique shortfall but rather a national problem--HUMINT. While JSOF elements have and are making strong attempts to rectify portions of this problem, it will take a national level effort to make significant progress.

Other than HUMINT, there are no "war stoppers." That is not to say that there are not still problems to be overcome. The

problems are there, but the impact on the operational capabilities is judged to be less than critical.

What the future may hold for JSOF intelligence is not at all clear. What is clear is that the environment is more dynamic than ever before. The intelligence demands will not shrink as the military shrinks in both size and budget. Downsizing of military forces and budgets will put increasing competitive pressures on the limited intelligence resources. If the decade-long revitalization of intelligence support to special operations forces is to continue, special operations intelligence must enjoy a national priority. This priority must be as high as that of the forces they support. If the emphasis and priority should wane, the Nation will possess a robust JSOF capability that is incapable of performing its missions due to insufficient intelligence capabilities.

APPENDIX A
Characteristics of Joint Special Operations
(extracted from JCS Test Pub 3-05)

- a. Are principally offensive, usually of high physical and political risk, and directed at high-value, critical and often perishable targets. They offer the potential for high returns, but rarely a second chance should a first mission fail.
- b. Often are principally politico-military in nature and subject to oversight at the national level. Frequently demand operator-level detailed planning and rapid coordination with other commands, Services, and Government agencies.
- c. Often require responsive joint ground, air and maritime operations and the C2 architecture permanently resident in the existing SF structure.
- d. May frequently be covert, clandestine, or low visibility in nature.
- e. Are frequently prosecuted when the use of conventional non-SO forces is either inappropriate or infeasible, for either military or political reasons.
- f. Rely on surprise, security, and audacity and frequently employ deception to achieve success.
- g. Are often conducted at great distances from established support bases, requiring sophisticated communications and means of infiltration, exfiltration, and support to penetrate and recover from hostile, denied, or politically sensitive areas.

- h. May require patient, long-term commitment in a given operational area to achieve national goals through security assistance/nation-building activities or extended unconventional warfare (UW) operations. Often, the training and organization of indigenous forces are required to attain these objectives.
- i. Frequently require discriminated and precise use of force; a mix of high and low technology weapons and equipment (depending upon the specific situation and sophistication of the opposition); and often require rapid development, acquisition, and employment of weapons and equipment not standard for other DOD forces.
- j. Are primarily conducted by specially trained, often specially recruited and selected personnel, organized into small units tailored for specific missions or environments. Missions often require detailed knowledge of the culture(s) and language(s) of the country where employed.
- k. Require detailed intelligence, thorough planning, decentralized execution, and rigorous detailed rehearsals.

ANNEX B

JOINT SPECIAL OPERATIONS INTELLIGENCE COURSE

(as of 13 November 1992)

<u>Class</u>	<u>Instructor</u>	<u>Subject</u>	<u>Hours</u>
LIC 350.0	DEA2B	DIC REGISTRATION IN-PROCESSING	1
LIC 350.1	BRENNAN	COURSE INTRODUCTION/OVERVIEW	1
LIC 350.2		HISTORY OF SOF INTELL SUPPORT	2
		USCINCSOC VIDEO	1
LIC 350.3	BRENNAN	SOF OVERVIEW	2
	BRENNAN	ARSOF	1
	BRENNAN	NAVSOF	1
	BRENNAN	AFSOF	1
	BRENNAN	PSYOPS/CA	1
LIC 350.6	TEHAN	NATIONAL INTELL SUPPORT STRUCTURE	1
		SIGINT SUPPORT TO SOF	1
		HUMINT SUPPORT TO SOF	1
		IMINT SUPPORT TO SOF	1
	BRENNAN	THEATER INTELL SUPPORT TO SOF	1
	BRENNAN	SOF INTELLIGENCE ELEMENTS	1
	BRENNAN	INTELL TRNG/EXERCISE SUPPORT	1
LIC 350.7	MILLER	SORDAC INTELLIGENCE SUPPORT	2
LIC 350.8	PREGENT	LEGAL ISSUES	2
LIC 350.10	TEHAN	REQUIREMENTS/COLLECTION PROCESS	2
LIC 350.12	TEHAN	ANALYSIS	2
LIC 350.13	MILLS/WILSON	PRODUCTION	4
LIC 350.13	BRENNAN	DISSMENINATION	2
LIC 350.15	TEHAN	AUTOMATED FILES	2
LIC 350.16	SOCOM	SOCRATES DEMONSTRATION	2
LIC 350.16	SOCOM	WEATHER/HYDROGRAPHY	2
LIC 350.18	GOEBELER	INTELL SPT TO DECEPTION/OPSEC	2
LIC 350.19	LEACH/DIA	MC&G	3
LIC 350.20	GOEBELER	COVER	2
LIC 350.21	BRENNAN	FUNDING/RESOURCE ACTIVITIES	1
LIC 350.22	BRENNAN/BERRY	EVASION AND RECOVERY	2
LIC 350.23	BERRY	MEDICAL INTELL CONSIDERATIONS	2
LIC 350.24		SOF SUPPORT AGENCY SEMINAR	2
	BRENNAN	VIDEO BRIEFBACK--JRTC	2
		STRATEGIC AND THEATER PLANNING	2
	BRENNAN	PRACTICAL EXERCISE A	2-3
LIC 350.9	TEHAN	INTELLIGENCE PLANNING/REQUIREMENTS	2
LIC 350.5	TEHAN	TARGETING AND TIP	2-3
LIC 350.4	BRENNAN	PRACTICAL EXERCISE B	2
		SOF MISSION PLANNING	2-3
		PRACTICAL EXERCISE C	2
	TEHAN	INTEL SPT FOR EXECUTION	2
LIC 350.25		PRACTICAL EXERCISE D	4
LIC 350.26		OUTPROCESS/CRITIQUE	1
LIC 350.27		GRADUATION	1

APPENDIX C
COVERT OR CLANDESTINE--THE DEFINITIONS

The terms covert and clandestine conjure many interpretations in the minds of the reader. The precision in the use of these terms is often lacking with each author defining them as convenient. The terms have special significance to the special operations community. The significance revolves around the reporting and oversight associated with operations classified by these terms. While the oversight and reporting requirements are beyond the scope of this paper, it is sufficient to say that a covert by definition "special activity" (see endnote 22) brings with it far more oversight and coordination/approval requirements than a simple low visibility military operation. The following definitions are used throughout this paper and are offered in an attempt to clarify and not further muddy this complex and sensitive issue.

JCS PUB 1-1 DEFINITIONS

COVERT OPERATIONS-- (DOD) Operations which are so planned and executed as to conceal the identity of or permit plausible denial by the sponsor. They differ from clandestine operations in that emphasis is placed on concealment of identity of sponsor rather than on concealment of the operations.

CLANDESTINE OPERATION--(DOD) An activity to accomplish intelligence, counterintelligence, and other similar activities

sponsored or conducted by governmental departments or agencies, in such a way as to assure secrecy or concealment. (It differs from covert operations in that emphasis is placed on concealment of the operation rather than on concealment of identity of sponsor).

ENDNOTES

1. Army-Air Force Center for Low Intensity Conflict, A CLIC Conference Report, Langley Air Force Base, Va., p 2.
2. USSOCOM, "Special Operations Forces Status Report," March 1991, p 5.
3. Dick Cheney, Annual Report to the President and the Congress, Washington: Government Printing Office, p. 100.
4. B. Hugh Tovar, "Intelligence Assets and Special Operations", Special operations in US Strategy, Washington, NDU Press, 1984.
5. Harold R. Wilson, "Reflections on The Air Force's New Manual," Military Review, Nov 1992, p 26.
6. Clausewitz, Carl Von, On War, London: Penguin Books, 1968, p 387.
7. William J. Flavin, "Concept for Strategic Use of Special Operations Forces in the 1990s and Beyond", US Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, 1991, p.2.
8. Cheney, page 100.
9. On 2 November 1984, Secretary Weinberger announced the tests for the deployment of US military forces. These tests included: one, force should be used only in defense of a US vital interest; two, use military force only with the support of the Congress and American people; three, use force only as a last resort; fourth, use force only with the clear intent of winning; fifth, use military force only when a clear military objective has been defined; and sixth, use force only when gain supports the risk associated with using force.
10. Les Aspin, Chairman House Armed Services Committee. "With the Soviets and Cold War Gone, What is the Future for US Forces?" Retired Officer Association National Security Report, Nov 1992. p 24.
11. Army-Air Force Center For Low Intensity Conflict, A CLIC Conference Report, Langley Air Force Base, Va. 1989. 2
12. US Joint Chiefs of Staff, JCS PUBLICATION 3-05, Doctrine for Joint Special Operations (Test Pub), October 1990, p I-2.
13. Todd R. Greentree, "The United States and the Politics of Conflict in the Developing World. A Policy Study. CENTER PAPER, Center for study of foreign affairs, Foreign Studies Institute,

U.S. Department of State, No. 4, October, 1990.

14. Department of the Army, Army Focus 1992, US Army Publication and Printing Command. Washington, p 7.

15. Douglas H. Dearth, "Thinking about Intelligence," STRATEGIC INTELLIGENCE: THEORY AND PRACTICE. US Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, Pa. 1991. p 6.

16. John Macartney "Intelligence: A Consumer's Guide," in Strategic Intelligence: Theory and Application. Douglas Dearth, ed, US Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, 1991, p. 81.

17. Clausewitz, p 140.

18. Clausewitz. p.167.

19. Carl W. Stiner, USCINCSOC, United States Special Operations Forces: A strategic Perspective, USSOCOM, January 1992. p 4.

20. "...[T]he NCA has directed the establishment and maintenance of selected units specifically organized, trained, and equipped to conduct a range of highly classified and usually compartmented SO missions. They may be conducted in peacetime competition, conflict, or war and are routinely under the direct supervision of the highest command levels, often the NCA. These units, generically referred to as special mission units, are prepared and trained to execute a variety of SO missions under covert or clandestine circumstances while maintaining absolutely minimum individual and organizational visibility during day-to-day operations." JCS Test Pub 3-05, October 1990, page B-6.

21. "Special Activities" are governed by Executive Order 12333 and require presidential approval and congressional oversight. They are conducted abroad in support of national foreign policy objectives in a manner that conceals United States Government participation. Some SOF are trained and equipped to support such special activities." USSOCOM, "Special Operations Forces Status Report," March 1991, p 4.

22. The formation of a Joint Intelligence Center (JIC) for the Special Operations Command creates a special set of problems. The task is to build a fully capable intelligence center with 65 personnel and assure the center is totally mobile and capable of being deployed in support of a theater CINCs. Incumbent in this requirement is communications and intelligence automation capabilities sufficiently robust to operate with or without a tether to the USSOCOM headquarters at MacDill Air Force Base.

23. Morgan interview, 2 Nov 1992.

24. Public Law 102-484, "The DOD Authorization Act;" page 742.

25. Gates, p 11.

26. William G. Boykin, "Special Operations and Low-intensity Conflict Legislation: Why Was it Passed and Have the Voids Been Filled?" US Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, PA. 1991, p 50-51.

27. General Carl W. Stiner's statement to the Senate Armed Services Committee, March 5, 1992, "USSOCOM Challenges: Risk, Ambiguity, Diversity, Opportunity" Defense Issues, p. 9.

28. From an interview by the author with Col Dave McKnight, J-2, Joint Special Operations Command, 11 Jan 1992, Ft Bragg NC.

29. From an interview by the author with Colonel Paul Morgan, J-2, United States Special Operations Command, on 2 November 1992.

30. David L. Boren, "Rethinking US Intelligence", Defense Intelligence Journal, Vol 1(1992), p.28.

31. Dr. Robert M. Gates' statement to US Congress, Joint Committee Hearings 1 April 1992, as published in American Intelligence Journal, National Military Intelligence Association, Washington, volume 13, Nos 1&2, Winter/Spring 1992, p. 10.

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